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ATIORNEYS' FEES AGAINST GOVERNMENT
DEFENDANTS ECONOMICS REQUIRES
A NEW PROPOSAL
Mary C. Dunlap*
A few years ago, as Snoopy lay smiling on the roof of hIS dog
house, Charlie Brown stood nearby and declared: "When a person
takes on an mstitutIon, the mstitutIon has a definite tendency to
wm. Current law on the awarding of attorneys fees agamst gov
ernment defendants! should be exammed and understood m the
context of Charlie Brown s pithy observatIon. ThIS IS necessary be
cause federal and state governments are a shapmg force m all
litIgatIon. From court systems to the law itself, governmentally
financed JudicIal, legIslative, and admmistratIve VOIces are omnI
present.
ThIS ubIquitous presence gIves government the upper hand m
cIvil litIgatIon, especIally if procedure controls substance. Govern
ment, not prIvate mdividuals or entitIes, deCIdes who may sue
whom and who may sue the government. 2 It IS government whICh
deSIgnates the form and scope of its own liability 3 It IS govern
ment whICh determmes the rules of litIgatIon. 4 These rules differ
entIate between government and non-government defendants with
respect to serVIce of process,5 due dates for responSIve pleading, 6
*Visiting ASSOCiate Professor, Umversity of Texas at Austin School of Law, 1979.
B.A., 1968, J.D., 1971, Umversity of Califorma at Berkeley Cofounder and staff
attorney-teacher, Equal Rights Advocates, Inc. 1974-78.
1. The emphaSIS of thIS article IS upon federal CIvil law pertaInIng to attorneys
fees awards.
2. It IS disputable whether the legIslature or JudiCIal branch has the greater
power In determInIng nghts of action. See Cannon v. Umversity of ChIcago, 99 S. Ct.
1946 (1979), Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Overall, these two branches of govern
ment together deCIde when and whether government IS subject to suit.
3. Illustrative of thIS power are the exceptions to the Federal Tort ClaIms Act,
Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972) (Federal Tort
28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976). See LaIrd
ClaIms Act exempts government from action for property damage allegedly covered
by military plane somc boom); Dalehite
United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953) (Fed
eral Tort Claims Act did not render the federal government responsible for an explo
sIOn of its ammomum nitrate fertilizer).
4. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure constitute the governmental rule of lit
Igation.
5. FED. R. CIV P 4(d)(4).
6. [d. 12(a).
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and availability of default Judgment; 7 and where the differences are
not explicit, they are customary 8
Yet, government IS not a homogeneous structure with a smgu
lar purpose, scope, or form. Governmental entitIes mclude federal,
state, and mUnIcIpal governmg bodies, each havmg numerous sub
divISIOns. PhilosophICal differences as to attorneys fees have been
manifested by a contmumg IdeologICal four way tug of war between
the Supreme Court, the lower courts, Congress, and the states.
The latest demonstratIon of thIS tug of war IS exemplified m the
United States Supreme Court's declSlon m Hutto v. Finney 9 In
Hutto the Court held that Congress may deCIde when attorneys
fees are to be awarded agamst state and local governments. The
court found that the eleventh amendment 10 did not bar the award
of attorneys fees to a prevailing party agamst a state offiCIal to the
extent that such an award was grounded upon the Civil Rights At
torney s Fees Awards Act of 1976. 11 The actIon was agaInst state of
fiCIals based on cruel and unusual pUnIshment for theIr failure to
cure conditIons m a pnson. 12
While Hutto may mdicate a state-federal constitutIOnal strug
gle, the ImplementatIon of the attorneys fees concept ongmally
caused a tug of war between the Supreme Court on one sIde and
Congress and lower federal courts on the other Until the Supreme
Court's 1975 declSlon m Alyeska Pipeline Sermce Co v Wilderness
Soctety 13 JudicIal discretIon had been exercIsed frequently by
lower courts m the awarding of attorneys fees agamst both public
and pnvate defendants. Awards were gIVen to prevailing partIes
7. Id. 55(e).
8. In the author expenence, lateness and delay on the part of government liti
gants are more often abided by Judges than lateness and delay on the part of non
governmental litigants, espeCially In matters such as responsive pleadings, motions
to Intervene and bnefs.
9. 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (Burger, C.J., RehnqUlst, White, & Powell, JJ, dis
senting).
10. "The JudiCial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit In law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
12. The action In Hutto was brought pursuant to § 1983 for failure of state
pnson offiCials to cure conditions amounting to cruel and unusual pumshment. See
437 U.S. at 681, 693. The Attorney General of Arkansas unsuccessfully argued that
the awarding of attorneys fees against state offiCials was not authonzed by the Civil
Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976 and was prohibited by the eleventh
amendment,Id. at 693.
13. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
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who litIgated cases "in the public mterest" as private attorneys
general. "14 Alyeska limited the discretIOnary authority of the lower
courts to award these fees. IS In direct response to the Supreme
Court's positIon, Congress passed the Civil Rights Attorney s Fees
Awards Act. 16 While still m its mfancy the Act's primary message
14. See Newman
Piggle Park EnterprIses, 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (awarding fees
under the public accommodations section of the 1964 Civil Rights Act displays
congressIOnal policy In favor of prIvate litigation as the major means of securIng stat
Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86 (1971) (applied Newman ra
utory compliance); Lea
tionale to title VII cases despite the fact that the attorney was hired as an
orgallizational attorney who did not look to the plaIntiff for the feel; Lee
Southern
Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971) (further policy of encouragIng prIvate
litigation to enforce statute by permitting recovery of attorney fees when black
plailltiff IS deprIved of civil rIghts when barred from the sale of land); La Raza Umda
v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (successful action resulted In effectuation of
strong public policy of environmental protection for many, the Illdivlduals brlllgIng
suit would be awarded fees from the state treasury).
15. 421 U.S. at 269.
[Because] the approach taken by Congress to thiS Issue [of attorneys fees]
has been to carve out specific exceptions to general rule that federal courts
cannot award attorneys fees beyond the limits of 28 U.S.C. § 1923, those
courts are not free to fashIOn drastic new rules with respect to the allowance
of attorneys fees to the prevailing party III federal litigation or to pICk and
choose among plaIntiffs and the statutes under whICh they sue and to award
fees In some cases but not III others, depending upon the courts assessment
of the Importance of the public poliCies Involved III particular cases.

[d.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). ThiS act provides In part:
[I]n any action or proceeding to enforce prOVISIOn of Sections 1981, 1982,
1983, 1985, and 1987 of thiS title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or III any
civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of AmerIca,
to enforce, or chargIng
VIOlation of the United States Internal Revenue
Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, In its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, reasonable at
torney fee as part of the costs.

[d.
The substantive areas covered above Illclude suits InvolvIng: racial discrImllla
tion In contracts and employment under § 1981. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160
(1976); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); Johnson
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975); Scott v. Umversity of Del., 601
F.2d 76 (3d Cir. 1979); Alexander
Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass of Machlllists
and Aerospace Workers, 565 F.2d 1364 (6th Cir. 1977), houslllg and property transac
Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Dillon
AFBIC Dev
tions under § 1982: Jones
Corp., 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1979); Taylor v. Fletcher Properties, Inc., 592 F.2d 244
Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977); Meyers
(5th Cir. 1979); ReSident AdVISOry Bd.
Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass n, 559 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1977), suits by
sub-federal governments under §§ 1983, 1985 (1), (2) & 1966: Hall v. Pennsylvama
State Police, 570 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1978); Wiley v. MemphiS Police Dep't, 548 F.2d
1247 (6th Cir. 1977); Kimbrough
O'Neil, 523 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1975); Vasquez
City of Reno, 461 F Supp. 1098 (D. Nev 1978), by prIvate conspirators under § 1985
(3): see Griffin
Breckenndge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); McLellan
MiSSISSIPPI Power &
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appears to be that a sIgnificant part of the pnvate attorney gen
eral" basIs for fee awards, overturned by Alyeska, has been recon
structed. Alyeska allows fees to be awarded under the common
fund,
substantIal benefit, and "bad faith theones, "17 the Act
Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977); McNally
Pulitzer PublishIng Co., 532
F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1976); Cohen v. IllinOis Inst. of Technology, 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir.
1975); Croy
SkInner, 410 F Supp. 117 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Reichardt
Payne, 396 F
Supp. 1010 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Hohensee v. Dailey, 383 F Supp. 6 (M.D. Pa. 1974),
federally aSSisted programs under § 2000d; Hills
Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976);
Lau
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Coates
IllinOiS State Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d
445 (7th Cir. 1977); Joy
Damels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973); Shannon
HUD,
436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970); BOSSier Pansh School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th
Cir. 1967); Otero
Mesa County Valley School Dist., 470 F Supp. 326 (D. Colo.
1979); School Dist. of SagInaw
HEW 431 F Supp. 147 (E.D. Mich. 1977), sex dis
crimInation suits agaInst sub-federal governments under § 1983: see Monell
De
partment of Social ServICes, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Marshall
Kirkland, 602 F.2d 1282
(8th Cir. 1979); Simcropi
Nassau County, 601 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1979); Allen
LovejOY 553 F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1977); Braden v. Umversity of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d
948 (3d Cir. 1977); Vorchelmer
School Dist., 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), by con
spIrators to depnve persons of Civil nghts on account of sex under §§ 1983 &
1985(3): Life Ins. Co. of North Amenca
Reichart, 591 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1979);
Cohen
IllinOIS Inst. of Technology, 581 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1979); Girard v. 94th St.
& Fifth Ave. Corp. 530 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1976); Cohen
IllinOIS Inst. of Technology
524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975); Weise v. Syracuse Umv 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975);
Vasquez
City of Reno, 461 F Supp. 1098 (D. Nev 1978); Hams v. Pennsylvama,
419 F Supp. 10 (M.D. Pa. 1976), federally aSSisted educational programs under 20
U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (1976): see Cannon
Umversity of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946 (1979);
Jumor College Dist. v. Califano, 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1979); Islesboro School
Comm.
Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir. 1979); Umversity of Toledo
HEW 464
F Supp. 693 (N.D. OhIO 1979); PIascik
Cleveland Museum of Art, 426 F Supp.
779 (N.D. OhIO 1976); Cape
Tennessee Second School Athletic Ass n, 424 F
Supp. 732 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), suits based upon sub-federal or conspIratonal VIOla
tions of constitutional or Civil nghts, under §§ 1983 & 1985: see Murphy
Mount
Carmel High School, 543 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1976); Mulligan v. Schlachter, 389 F.2d
231 (6th Cir. 1968); Moran
Bench, 353 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1965); Sixth Camden
Corp.
Township of Eversham, 420 F Supp. 709 (D. N.J. 1976); Hams
Ward,
418 F Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Croy
Skmner, 410 F Supp. 117 (N.D. Colo.
1976); cf Great Am. Fed. Sav & Loan Ass v. Novotny, 99 S. Ct. 2345 (1979) (the
court held that vIOlation of title VII could not be asserted through § 1985(c) ac
tion); and, tax cases where non-United States defendants prevail under the Internal
Revenue Code: But cf, Southeast Legal Defense Group v. Adams, 436 F Supp. 891
(D. Or. 1977) (Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976 does not authonze at
torneys fees agamst federal defendant but does agamst state defendant); Aparacor,
Inc. v United States, 571 F.2d 552 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (Civil Rights Attorney Fees
Awards Act of 1976 does not authonze attorney fees for taxpayer mitiated refund
suit).
17 421 U.S. 257-59. The Supreme Court defined each of the theOries upon
whICh attorneys fees could be awarded, absent an authorIzmg statute. Under the
common fund theory the equitable powers of the courts allow for an attorney to re
ceive proportionate share of plamtiffs recovered or preserved common fund. Id. at
257 The attorneys fees IS to be paid out of the fund. [d. The equity power of the
court IS also applied under the common benefit theory where the losmg party whICh
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provIdes a broader foundatIOn for attorneys fees awards agamst
certam government defendants m specific cases. 18
Alyeska also left open the award of attorneys fees based on ex
plicit statutory authonzatIOn. 19 The present body of federal statu
tory law on attorneys fees, however resembles an unfimshed
patchwork quilt.20 Statutes permittmg awards of attorneys fees ap
pear serendipitously 21 While it IS safer and eaSIer to prevail on the
question of attorneys fees by usmg a statute rather than by relymg
upon the "bad faith,
common fund, or substantial benefit
theones,"22 it IS not always easy to find the statutes. Once the
statute IS found, however the battle IS not won. Plamtiffs must
prevail pnor to any fee award. Prevailing agamst the government
was compelled to pay attorneys fees was the benefiCIary of the litigation. See Mills
Electnc Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (corporate defendant In stockholders
denvative suit had to pay the attorneys fees of the plaIntiff shareholders under the
theory that the corporation benefited from the litigation). The court may also award
attorneys fees agaInst a party whICh proceeds In bad faith, or for vexatious, wanton
or oppressIve reasons. 421 U.S. at 259.
For an exhaustive diSCUSSIOn of these theones and the cases applYIng them see
Salisbury Equitable Bases for Attorneys Fees, 1 COURT AWARDED FEES IN "PUBLIC
INTEREST LITIGATION 157-78 (H. Newburg, Chrmn. 1978).
18. The applicability of § 1988 to cases where federal offiCIals, agencIes or enti
ties are defendants IS the subject of current, unresolved litigation. Compare Shannon
v. HUD,433 F Supp. 249 (E.D. Pa. 1977), afl'd, 577 F.2d 854 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1002 (1979) (the court of appeals held that the Civil Rights Attor
neys Fees Awards Act of 1976 did not permit an award of counsel fees agaInst the
United States In suit brought under title VII of the Act because there was no clear
statutory authority to permit the award) with NAACP
Bell, 448 F Supp. 1164 (D.
D.C. 1978) (suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 agaInst the Justice Department
challengIng non-dual prosecution policy In whICh the plaIntiff was awarded attor
neys fees even after the department changed its policy makIng the case moot).
19. 421 U.S. at 270-71.
20. ThIS patchwork has prompted one commentator to observe: "[M]embers of
Congress frequently offer attorney fee amendments, without much fanfare, to bills as
they move through the legIslative process. Thus one must look very carefully, espe
CIally through volumInOUS legIslation, to find
counsel fee provlSlon that may be
applicable to vour case. Wolf, Federal LegIslative Outlook For New Opportunities
For Fee Awards, 2 COURT AWARDED FEES IN "PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
412-13 (H. Newburg, Chnnn. 1978).
21. Among the federal statutes affording attorneys fees awards In CIvil nghts
litigation that have not been mentioned are: The Freedom of Infonnation and Pn
vacy Acts, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E), (g)(2)(B), (3)(B)(1976); The FaIr Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976) encompaSSIng the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Id. § 206(d)
and the Age DiscnmInation In Employment Act, Id. § 621, The VotIng Rights Act
ExtenSIOn of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 19731. (e) (1976); The Emergency School AId Act of
1972,20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976); The Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b),
2000e-5(k) (1976). See Cohen, Award of Attorneys Fees Against the United States:
The SovereIgn Is Still Somewhat Immune, 2 W NEW ENG. L. REV 177 (1979).
22. See note 17 supra.
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entails distmct economIC23 as well as legal consIderations.
ThIs author knows of no case m whICh government, great or
small, old or new has been compelled to go mto court without
counselor to forego litIgatIon because of madequate economIC re
sources. Government has the maSSIve, expandable litIgatIOn re
sources whIch allow it to appear m court whenever necessary To
the pnvate litIgant, government IS an economICally formIdable, if
not mvmcible, opponent. Furthermore, III cases where government
IS a defendant, the disparity of economIC resources IS remforced by
the fact that the government attorneys are compensated, wm, lose,
or draw
In companson, the pnvate litIgants attorney often works on
the contmgency of a negotIated or court-ordered fee award. ThIs
arrangement IS often necessitated by the client's mability to afford
counsel. Therefore, non-governmental attorneys are confronted
with the ImpractIcability of years of protracted litIgatIon and
escalated costs, usually with no mtenm compensatIOn. 24 Thus, the
awarding of attorneys fees theoretIcally enabling attorneys to ac
cept essentIal constitutional and cIvil nghts claIms, may be an
illusory politIcal promIse when such a system IS predicated upon a
substantIal mitIal capital expenditure.
To prevail IS an absolute prereqmsite to receIpt of the fee
23. Nongovernment funds for public Interest" law are shnnkIng. COUNCIL
FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAw BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FINANCING PUB
LIC INTEREST LAw IN AMERICA (1976).
In the prototypical realm of title VII, employment discnmInation for example,
one recent foundation report describes the economic phenomenon:
Title VII cases are becomIng ever more difficult to litigate because of the
cost of discovery and the need for expensive experts
the discovery proc
ess affords
determIned opponent numerous opportunities to escalate the
cost of the proceedings even more. PrOVided defendants are willing to spend
money to combat Title VII claims and there IS every Indication of an In
creased willingness on their part to do so, they can launch an all out paper
war, expanding the scope of discovery through their own demands for Infor
mation, while resisting plaIntiffs requests. PlaIntiffs are forced to further ex
penditures of time and money if they want to move the action along. While
the enormous cost of discovery IS not umque to Title VII actions-the
pervasiveness of the problem has prompted cnes for refonn-the harm IS
particularly acute when, as In Title VII actions, there IS an enormous dis
parity between the financial resources of the parties.
M. BERGER, LITIGATION ON BEHALF OF WOMAN: AN ASSESSMENT 54-56 (1979) (foot
notes omitted) (emphaSIS added).
24. But see Bradley
Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 723 (1974); Chan
dler v. Roudebush, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. ~75S9, at 4904 (C.D. Cal. 1977). An Intenm
award, however, IS of no use where the prevailing party must prOVide one hundred
percent collateral for bond III order to receive the fee. See Smith v. Umon Oil Co.,
IS Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. l1S3 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
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award m cIvil cases. ThIs prereqUIsite may seem stunmngly logICal
on its surface, m that the declared purpose of these statutes IS to
encourage the representatIOn of persons havmg meritOriOUS claIms.
The prevailing party standard, however should be reexammed
more closely m light of other broader purposes of litigation agamst
government. 25 It should also be reexammed In light of the reality
that government defendants are free to make ligitatIon prohib
itively expenSIve regardless of the merits.
ConSIderation should be gIVen to a new approach to the
awarding of attorneys fees. As a congreSSIOnally controlled experi
ment, legIslation should be enacted that would reqUIre payment of
attorneys fees awards agamst government defendants m all cases
presently covered by the attorneys fee statutes, whether or not the
plamtiff prevails. ObVIOusly the courts would prohibit awards m all
actions whICh were "frivolous, unreasonable or without founda
tIon"26 or whIch were conducted m "bad faith. "27 ThIS proposition
would not modify the current criteria used by the courts to pro
hibit the award of attorneys fees.
The chIef hypotheSIS of the proposed experiment IS that most
plamtiffs, excluding multmatIonal corporations, challengmg the
government are m a position of economIC disadvantage. Thus,
there IS a strategIc premIUm for government defendants to protract
litigation, escalate costs and conduct wasteful paper wars m order
to overwhelm the plamtiffs. If thIS method of legal advocacy by war
of attritIOn IS used m meritOriOUS cases, it will undermme the es
sential princIple of statutes such as the Civil Rights Attorney s Fees
Awards Act of 1976.
25. Consideration should be given, for example, to public mformation and edu
cation, government accountability, political orgamzmg and first amendment exercises
by oppressed groups.
26. See Chnstianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978) (district
court may award attorney fees to preVailing title VII defendant upon finding that
the plaintiff' case was fnvolous, unreasonable or without foundation, even though
suit was not brought with subjective bad faith).
27. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973) (prevailing respondent awarded at
torneys fees under § 102 of Labor Management Reporting Disclosure Act, m suit to
regam membership m umon after dismissal for alleged deliberate and malicIOUS vili
fication of umon management). The Court stated that while the presence of bad faith
IS essential to fee shifting, bad faith alone IS not dispositive under
national policy
accepting the common benefit doctnne. 412 U.S. at 15. Flashmann Distilling Corp.
Maler Brewmg Co., 386 U.S. 714, 719 (1967) (Lanham Act does not allow for re
deliberate mfnngement of trade
covery of attorneys fees even when there was
mark nghts, however, fees are appropnate m certam ClTcumstances such as Civil con
tempt action based upon wilful disobedience); Vaugh v. Atkmson, 369 U.S. 527
(1962) (plaintiff received maintenance award and attorneys fees m lieu of damages
when respondents callous attitude resulted m Ineffective medical treatment).
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A second hypothesIs also can be posited. If there IS an award
of attorneys fees whether or not the plamtiff wms, government de
fendants will be discouraged from wastmg public tax mOnIes and
governmental resources whIch result from protracted litIgatIOn.
Thus, adoption of the proposal will encourage expedient resolutIOn
based chIefly on the merits, and not on relative economIC endur
ance.
Like any radical legIslatIve experiment, the proposed program
carnes certam rISks. There IS the possibility that legal profeSSIOnal
opportunIsm will be encouraged, resultmg III a proliferation of
poorly handled, publicly financed lawsuits under the experimental
law There IS also the mterrelated possibility that courts will reSIst
the awarding of fees by expanding the prohibitory "frivolous, un
reasonable," without foundatIon," and "bad faith standards. If
thIs expanSIOn occurs, it will prevent awards to many deservmg
plamtiffs.
The extent of expenditure of public momes to pay such fee
awards, and the likelihood of abusIve actions on the part of some
attorneys, are exceedingly difficult to predict. Nevertheless, to the
extent that present attorneys fees awards statutes sIgnify major
congressIOnal determmatIOns about public mterest" priorities, 28
the proposed experiment would be gUIded by a recognitIOn that it
would be unlikely to worsen the present gap between theory and
practice, whICh IS presently perpetuated by litIgation resource
disparities between government and others.
The proposal merits consIderatIon and ImplementatIOn because
the distance IS too great between the prinCIple that certaIn litiga
tion deserves public financIng and the reality that some of that liti
gation agamst government defendants IS plaInly economIcally mfea
sible. Too often, public Interest law concerns are displaced because
of the politIcal and economIC primacy of the government as a law
maker law enforcer, law mterpreter and CIvil defendant. The pro
posal, to authOrize awards to plaIntiffs for litigatIOn of partIcular
types of cases whether or not they prevail, IS aImed at reducmg the
mequity of litIgation resources that presently dimIllishes the practI
cal, real-life worth and effectIveness of public Interest attorneys
fees awards law

28. The proposed legislative expenment assumes lack of comprehenSiveness
of current federal statutory attorneys fees awards proVISIOns encompassmg substan
tive public mterest" law pnorities. There are Significant pnorities, such as con
sumer and enviTonmental protection Issues that are not currently addressed by the
patchwork quilt of statutes.

